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CASES NOTED
division D29 of section 344-a and said, " ... upon that subject we think it
appropriate to suggest that the information the defendants seek may be
the objective of a corrective motion . . . or a bill of particulars . . . " but
its absence will not result in dismissal for failure to state a cause of action. 0
In the instant case, the court followed the rule set down in the Arams
case, but refused to adopt the theory that the tort law involved was rudi-
mentary. In the latter context the court can not be criticized, since the action
was for non-fault liability, a doctrine dependent upon master-servant rela-
tionships which are not universally recognized. The federal court-which
was bound to apply New York law as it is, not as the court thinks it ought
to be, 1 or thinks it will be-made no mention of the opinion expressed in
the Pfleuger case by the New York high court. The plaintiff was a stranger
to Saudi Arabia; the defendant corporation conducted extensive business
there and could in all probability have easily assisted the court in judicially
learning the Saudi-Arabian law with savings in time and cost. Perhaps this
was the type of adverse consideration the court had in mind in the Pfleuger
case in its general discussion concerning the statute and matters secified
therein. However, since that decision concerned the law of a sister state,
the court could not properly follow it as precedent in the instant case and
reluctantly permitted an apparent injustice to occur.
With the ever increasing rate of international intercourse, an increase
in the number of actions involving the law of foreign countries is inevitable.
The international traveler will need available means of establishing claims
and defenses based on foreign law. The majority of such actions will
undoubtedly be tried in the larger cities where necessary facilities, such as
a panel of experts and foreign law libraries, could be annexed to the courts.
It is submitted that a two-fold purpose would be served by equipping the
courts to judicially notice the law of foreign countries: economies would be
effected in valuable courtroom time, and a better form of justice would be
available to the traveler of modest means.
WILLANm A. KOLODGY
AGENCY - INDEPENDENT CONTRACTORS -
NEWSBOYS
A newspaper carrier, while making his deliveries on a motorcycle,
negligently struck and injured the plaintiff. Held, plaintiff could not re-
cover from newspaper company, as carrier was an independent contractor
and not an employee. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So.2d 276
(Fla. 1956).
29. See note 2 supia.
30. Pfleuger v. Pfleuger, SU/,ra at 152, 106 N.E.2d at 497.
31. I]axon Co. v. Stentor Elee. Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941).
UNIvRSI''Y OF PfIMIri Ltv RiwElEx'
The principal test applied by the courts in determining if the relation-
ship of the parties is that of employer and servant or hirer-independent
contractor lics in the right to control the manner in which the work
is to be performed.1 However, numerous other tests for determining the
relationship of the parties have been propounded by the Restatement.2 At
least one court has held that the right to hire and fire should be given
consideration, 3 while another court has held that this power conclusively
indicated a master-servant relationship. It would appear that no one
test or circumstance has been found which, in itself, conclusively indicates
the relationship of the parties. Each individual case must be resolved upon
its own particular facts and circumstances.5
Whether newspaper companies are vicariously liable under the doctrine
of respondeat superior for the torts committed by their carriers has
been the subject of much litigation. In cases where the company has been
held not liable,0 the contract of cmployment usually provided that the
carrier was an independent contractor and the company was to exercise
11 control over the manner in which the papers were to be delivered.
However, in cases involving the same contract terms courts have held
otherwise.7 In the former group of cases, the courts looked no further than
to the contract itself,8 while in the latter group, the courts not only
considered the contract, but also looked to the actual conduct of the
parties.'
1. Bohanon v. McClatchy Pub. Co., 16 Cal. App.2d 188, 60 P.2d 510 (1936);
Gulf Refining Co. v. Wilkinson, 94 Fla. 664, 114 So. 503 (1927); Morris v. Constitution
Pub. Co., 84 Ga. App. 816, 67 S.E.2d 407 (1951); Bell v. Sawyer, 313 Mass. 250,
47 N.E.2d 1 (1943); Gall v. Detroit Journal Co., 191 Mich. 405, 158 N.E. 36 (1916);
Caller v. Slursberg, 22 N.J. Super. 477, 92 A.2d 89 (1952).
2. RE.STATEENT, AcENcY § 220 (2) (1933). The following tests are therein
provided; "(a) extent of control which, by agreement, the master may exercise over
the details . . . ; (b) vhether . . . distinct occupation or business; (c) the kind of
occupation . . . ; (d) the skill required . . . . (e) whether the employer or the
workman supplies the instrumentalities, tools, and the place of work . . . ; (f) the length
of time for which the person is employed; (g) the method of payment ... ; (h) whether
or not the work is a part of the regular business of the employer; and (i) whether
or not the parties believe they are creating the relationship of master and servant."
3. Matter of Scatalo, 257 App. Div. 471, 14 N.Y.S.2d 45 (1939), aff'd, 282 N.Y.
689, 26 N.E.2d 815 (1940).
4. Lassiter v. Cline, 222 N.C. 271, 22 S.E.2d 558 (1942).
5. Schaller v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n., 11 Cal. App.2d 46, 77 P.2d 836 (1938).
6. Morris v. Constitution Pub. Co., 84 Ga. App. 816, 67 S.E.2d 407 (1951);
Oklahoma Pub. Co. v. Greenlee, 150 Okla. 69, 300 Pac. 684 (1931); Moore %'. Burriss,
132 W. Va. 757, 54 S.E.2d 23 (1949).
7. Elder v. Aetna Cas. Co., 149 Tex. 620, 236 S.W.2d 611 (1951); Salt Lake
Tribune Pub. Co. v. Industrial Comm'n. 99 Utah 259. 102 P.2d 307 (1940); Femling
%. Star Pub. Co., 195 Wash. 395, 81 1.2d 293 (1938), set aside on other grounds, 195
Wash. 395, 84 P.2d 1008 (1938).
8. Rathburn v. Payne, 21 Cal. App.2d 49, 68 P.2d 291 (1937); Bass v. Kansas
City Journal Post Co., 347 Mo. 681, 148 S.W.2d 548 (1941); Greening v. Gazette
Printing Co., 108 Mont. 158, 88 P.2d 862 (1939).
9. Scorpion v. American-Republican, 131 Conm. 42, 37 A.2d 802 (1944) (The
contracts alone are not determinative of the question of agency and upon all the
evidence the jury might have properly found that the carrier was the agent of the
defendant.); Elder v. Aetna Cas, Co., 149 Tex. 620, 236 SA..2d 611 (1951) (Regardless
C ASEs Nxri1
The question must be considered in the light of how far the courts,
as well as the legislatures, will go in applying the doctrine of vicarious
liability. In determining the status of the newsboy for the purposes of
Workmen's Compensation and labor legislation the courts have been more
liberal in holding the newsboy to be an employee. However, these 'cases
indicate that the courts are reluctant to extend this liberality for the
purpose of determining the tort liability of the companies.' Nevertheless,
in the face of this reluctance on the part of the courts, some states have
become conscious of the necessity of extending the doctrine of vicarious
liability in order to provide a means of placing responsibility on the person
who is financially able to compensate the injured party. This has been
accomplished through legislative enactments," and in at least one state, by
judicial decision.-' Perhaps financial responsibility was not the sole reason
for extension of the doctrine, but it cannot be denied that the result is
in accord with the mandate of modern society not to allow an injured
party to suffer a wrong without recompense.
Although the decision in the instant case is in accord with the numerical
weight of authority, the court disregarded the actual conduct of the
parties,'' and looked no further than the contract itself. If the surrounding
circumstances had been taken into consideration, the only logical conclu-
sion that could have been reached would have been incompatible with
the legal concept of hirer-independent contractor. In determining the
relationship of the parties, their extra-contractual deportment should also be
scrutinized, for to hold otherwise would be to invite employers to elude
liability by simply signing a contract which does not manifest the true
of what the contract purported, the determining question is, did the company actually
exercise the right to control.)
10. Press Pub. Co. v. Industrial Ace. Comm'n, 190 Cal. 114, 210 Pac. 820 (1922);
Laurel Daily Leader, Inc. v. James, 224 Miss. 654, 80 So.2d 770 (1955); ("We have
repeatedly held the rule is more liberal in compensation cases. We are not concerned
with a rule of liability of appellant if appellee had struck some one with his motor-bike
and inflicted an injury upon a third person. ). Harm %'. Times Dispatch Pub. Co.,
166 Va. 102, 184 S.E. 183 (1936).
I1. CAL. VEHICLE CoDE Ass. § 402 (Supp. 1955), InAHo CODE ANN. § 49-1004(1948), IOWA CODE ANN. c. 321, § 321.493 (Supp, 1956), N.Y. VECLE AND "RAl'Fic
LAw § 59. TFypical of these is New York's:
Every owner of a motor vehicle or motorcycle operated upon a public highway
shall be liable and responsible for death or injuries to the person or property
resulting from negligence in the operation of such motor vehicle or motorcycle,
in the business of stich owner or otherwise, by any person legally using or
operating the same with the permission, express or implied, of such owner.
(Emphasis added).
12. May v. Palm Beach Chemical Co., 77 So.2d 468 (Fla. 1955); Southern Cotton
Oil Co. v. Anderson, 80 Fla. 441, 86 So. 629 (1920). (The owner of a motor vehicle
who intrusts it to another to operate is liable for injury caused to others by the negligence
of the person to whom it is intrusted.)
13. Miami Herald Pub. Co. v. Kendall, 88 So.2d 276 (Fla. 1956) (The supervision,
by the company as to the hours of work, the complaints regarding service, or as to
subscriptions, collections, or prices of papers did not vitiate' the provisions in the contract.)
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relationship of the parties.14 If the employer is allowed to exculpate himself
from all liability by designating his employees as independent contractors,
the court's decision is not in conformity with social policy.
CERALD N. CAPPS
TORTS - NEGLIGENCE - CAR KEY STATUTES
The defendant automobile owner, in violation of a statute,' left his
car unattended with the key in the ignition. The car was stolen and the
thief, driving recklessly, injured the plaintiff. Held, the thief's driving at a
reckless rate of speed was an intervening cause which superseded the
original act of negligence of the defendant automobile owner.2 Permenter
v. Milner Chevrolet Co., 91 So.2d 243 (Miss. 1956).
Since the turn of the century the courts have been confronted with
the problem of imposing liability on an automobile owner to compensate
an injured third party when an unauthorized driver is at fault.3 In those
jurisdictions that have decided claims arising through violation of so called
"car key legislation,"' the majority have denied recovery as a matter of law
on the rationale that the violation of a penal statute is not intended to
result in civil liability;" some of these jurisdictions further conclude that
even assuming the violation of the statute0 is negligence per se, that the
negligence of the thief and not the violation is the proximate cause of
14. W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Crosley, 230 Ala. 403, 161 So. 536 (1935);
Scorpion v. American-Republican, 131 Conn. 42, 37 A.2d 802 (1944); Howe Fire
Apparatus Co. v. Humphrey, 113 Ind. App. 167, 46 N.E.2d 259 (1943); Goetschel
v. Glassell-Wilson Co., 13 La. App. 424, 127 So. 81 (1930); Dagley v. National Suit &
Cloak Co., 224 Mo. App. 61, 22 S.W.2d 892 (1929); Ottinger v. Morris, 187 Okla.
517, 104 P.2d 254 (1939).
1. MIss. CODE § 8219 (1942) provides: "No person driving or in charge of a
motor vehicle shall permit it to stand unattended without first stopping the engine,
locking the ignition and removing the key ..... Other "car key" statutes are: ALA. CODE
tit. 36 § 27 (Supp. 1953): AEK. STAT. ANN. § 75-651 (1947); COLO. Rev. STAT.
c. 13-4-76 (1953); TRAFFIC AND MOTOR VEHICLE REGULATIONS FOR THE DISTRICT
OF COLUMBIA § 5N; iDAIIO CODE ANN. § 49-560.1 (Supp. 1953); ILL. REv. STAT. c. 95 ,§ 189 (1953); IND. ANN. STAT. § 47-2124 (1952); Ky. REv. STAT. § 189.430 (1953);
MD. ANN. CODE GEM. LAws art. 66 , § 212 (1951); N.M. STAT. ANN. c. 64-6-105
(1953); S.C. CODE ANN. § 46-491 (1952); WYo. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 60-530 (1945).
2. Three justices dissented.
3. Berman v. Schultz, 84 N.Y. Supp. 292 (1903); Martin v. Herzog, 228 N.Y.
164, 126 N.E. 14 (1920); Schell v. DuBois, 94 Ohio St. 93, 113 N. E. 664 (1916).
4. See note I supra.
5. Richards v. Stanley, 43 Cal. App. 2d 58, 271 P.2d 23 (1954); Sullivan v.
Griffin, 318 Mass. 358, 61 N.E.2d 330 (1945).
6. In the absence of statute the owner is not liable for the negligent operation
of the vehicle by a thief. Midkiff v. Watkins, 126 La. 449, 52 So.2d 573 (1951);
Saracco v. Lyttle, 11 N.J. Super. 254, 78 A.2d 288 (App. Div. 1951). Contra, Shaff v.
Claxton, 144F.2d 532 (D.C. Cir. 1944).
